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INJUNCTIVE RELIEF IN STATE COURTS FOR
BREACH OF A NO-STRIKE CLAUSE
Seven years have elapsed since the United States Supreme Court decided
in Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson' that federal courts were barred from
enjoining a strike which violates the no-strike clause of a labor contract.
An apparent conflict between section 4 of the Norris-La Guardia Act,2 which
removes federal court jurisdiction to grant injunctive relief against such vio-
lations, and section 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act,8 which grants federal
courts jurisdiction to remedy labor contract violations, was thereby re-
solved. An employer who brought suit pursuant to Section 301 was denied
that remedy, an injunction, which is most aptly suited to deal with the un-
lawful strike. As a result, a union which has agreed to a binding arbitration
no-strike contract may violate it by striking or by engaging in work stop-
pages and yet remain immune from federal injunction.4
Section 301 was undeniably designed by Congress to expand the relief
previously available for breach of labor contracts. The processes by which
this statute has become a vehicle for narrowing this relief must be exam-
ined.
The fact situation in which such a case develops is as follows: In the
course of collective bargaining negotiations, Company A and Union B de-
cide that it is mutually desirable for them to settle all grievances by
means of arbitration. To that end, they enter into a contract whereby
1 370 U.S. 195 (1962).
2 29 U.S.C. § 104 (1964) provides in relevant part:
No court of the United States shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining order
or temporary or permanent injunction in any case involving or growing out of any
labor dispute to prohibit any person or persons participating or interested in such
dispute (as these terms are herein defined) from doing, whether singly or in con-
cert, any of the following acts:
(a) Ceasing or refusing to perform any work or to remain in any relation of
employment ....
3 Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 301(a), 29 U.S.C. § 185
(1964) provides in relevant part:
Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization...
may be brought in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the
parties, without respect to the amount in controversy or without regard to the
citizenship of the parties.
4 The Norris-La Guardia Act relates only to legitimate activities of unions and does
not prevent federal courts from issuing an injunction to prevent the commission of a
crime, sabotage, or the destruction of property. Potomac Elec. Power Co. v. Washing-
ton Chapter of Congress of Racial Equality, 209 F. Supp. 559 (D.D.C. 1962); nor does
it deny them power to issue an injunction in an action growing out of a labor dispute
where the evidence clearly establishes that violence exists. J.B. Michael & Co. v. Iron
Workers Local 782, 173 F. Supp. 319 (W.D. Ky. 1959).
COMMENTS
Company A and Union B agree to be bound by any decision of the arbi-
tration panel. They also agree to refrain from the use of economic weap-
ons, Company A giving up its right to engage in a lockout and Union B
giving up its right to strike. A dispute arises and Union B, in violation of
the contract, orders its men off the job. Company A then demands that
Union B order the men back to work and agree to arbitrate the dispute.
At this point, Union B may refuse to arbitrate and continue the strike, or
it may agree to arbitrate and nonetheless continue the strike. In either
case, recognizing that the arbitration process could go on for an indefinite
period, Company A seeks to enjoin the strike, since that will most effec-
tively remedy the violation of the labor contract. Therefore, Company A
decides to file suit for injunctive relief. Company A must now decide
whether to bring the suit in state or federal court. The Union's amenability
to suit as an entity, while not entirely clear in the past,5 is today certain, at
least in federal court, due to the passage by Congress of Section 301.6
What would be the result of this case in each setting?
I. COMPANY A SEEKS AN INJUNCTiON AGAINST UNION B
IN FEDERAL COURT
Under Section 301, jurisdiction to entertain suits alleging breach of a
labor contract has been conferred on federal courts. However, in hearing
this suit the federal district court will be bound by the Sinclair decision.
Therefore, an injunction will be denied although the court may order spe-
cific performance of the agreement to arbitrate,1 grant damages s or deny
all relief.
The reasons for denying the injunction were well stated in Sinclair.
Faced with the equally applicable provisions of Section 4 and Section 301,
the Court held that Section 4 was controlling. In words which were later to
prove important, the court stated, "The District Court was correct in dis-
missing Count 3 [seeking an injunction] of petitioner's complaint for lack
of jurisdiction under the Norris-La Guardia Act."9 (emphasis added).
Justice Black, writing for the majority, relied on the legislative history of
the act and came to the conclusion that Congress did not intend to repeal
Section 4 by the passage of Section 301.10 This conclusion is hard to
5 See S. RElP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 15-18 (1947).
0 Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 301(b), 29 U.S.C. § 185
(1964) provides in relevant part:
Any labor organization which represents employees in an industry affecting com-
merce ... may sue or be sued as an entity and in behalf of the employees whom
it represents in the courts of the United States.
7 Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
8 Id.
9 370 U.S. 195, 215 (1962).
10 For a view comporting with Justice Black's that the Sinclair case is correct as a
matter of strict statutory interpretation see Wellington & Albert, Statutory Interpreta-
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refute, for the conference report makes clear that just such a repeal provi-
sion was reported by the House and rejected by the Conference Commit-
tee."' In dissent, Justice Brennan agreed with the majority opinion as far
as it went. He was willing, however, to look at both sections and resolve
the apparent conflict which Congress saw, but chose not to resolve. In
Justice Brennan's view, the Court was obligated to resolve the conflict by
harmonizing the two statutes so that the purposes of each would be effec-
tuated to the greatest degree. 12 The dissent proposed to achieve this by
allowing an injunction against peaceful strikes carried out in breach of col-
lective bargaining agreements. This would have resulted in giving maxi-
mum effect to Section 301 while interfering minimally with Section 4,
which Justice Brennan believed was not really intended to deal with labor
contract violations.' 3 By way of retort, Justice Black stated that it was not
for the Court "to reconsider and overrule the action of Congress in refusing
to repeal or modify the controlling commands of the Norris-La Guardia
Act."'14
The Sinclair case receded from a policy previously given wide scope by
the Court-that of encouraging arbitration. That policy was first annun-
ciated in the case of Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills'6 where the
Court stated that "the agreement to arbitrate grievance disputes is the
quid pro quo for an agreement not to strike."' 10 To effectuate this new
policy, the Court in Lincoln Mills decided that Section 301 authorized fed-
eral courts to fashion a body of federal law to enforce collective bargaining
agreements.' 7 Moreover, that federal law included the right to specific
performance of promises to arbitrate grievances. The Court held that the
anti-injunction provisions of the Norris-La Guardia Act did not prevent
federal courts from compelling arbitration's despite the fact it recognized
that a literal reading might bring the dispute within the terms of the
Act.' 9 Any doubt as to the scope of that arbitration policy was dispelled
by the Steelworkers Trilogy20 where the Court set forth the narrow limits
tlion and the Political Process: A Comment on Sinclair v. Atkinson, 72 YALE LJ. 1547
(1963).
11 I Lnoisr Tmrv HISTORY oF THE LMRA 570. The House bill provided for federal
jurisdiction of suits for breach of collective bargaining contracts and had expressly
declared that the Norris-La Guardia Act's anti-injunction provisions would not apply to
such suits. Id. at 221-22.
12 370 U.S. 195, 216 (1962).
13 Id. at 225.
14 Id. at 213.
15 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
16 Id. at 455.
17 Id. at 456.
18 Id. at 457-59.
19 Id. at 458.
20 United Steelworkers Union v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960);
United Steelworkers Union v. Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United
Steelworkers Union v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960).
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within which judicial review of an arbiter's decision was confined. How-
ever, three cases came to the Court in 1962 which required amplification
of the doctrine set forth in Lincoln Mills. Two gave added impetus to the
arbitral process, but one, Sinclair, created a significant roadblock.
The first case, Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney,21 held that state and
federal jurisdiction of suits for breach of labor contracts was concurrent.
The Court rejected the argument that Section 301 had preempted state
jurisdiction, noting that the purpose of Congress in enacting Section 301
was not to limit but to expand the availability of forums for the enforcement
of contracts made by labor organizations. 22
Then, in Teamsters' Local 174 v. Lucas Flour Co.23 the Court held that
a strike to settle a dispute which the collective bargaining agreement
provides shall be settled by binding arbitration constitutes a violation of
the agreement. In this case the employer had sought and received dam-
ages in the Washington state court, which had applied local law in arriving
at its result. Affirming that award, the Court held that state courts must
apply federal law and that in so doing incompatible doctrines of local law
must give way to principles of federal labor law.24 This was so because
the subject matter of Section 301 was peculiarly one that called for uniform
law. The Court recognized that conflicting legal approaches might impede
the parties' willingness to resort to binding arbitration.
It was against this background that the Court faced the Sinclair case.
In several earlier cases, the Court had been faced with a conflict between
the Norris-La Guardia Act and other federal statutes. In United States v.
Hutcheson25 a possible conflict between section 20 of the Clayton Act 20
and the Norris-La Guardia Act was resolved by reading them together
"as a harmonizing text,"27 thus removing an otherwise indictable offense
under the Clayton Act from the purview of the federal courts. In Brother-
hood of R.R. Trainmen v. Chicago R. & I. R.R.28 the Court reconciled provi-
sions of the Railway Labor Act calling for binding arbitration 9 by enjoin-
ing a strike despite the provisions of the Norris-La Guardia Act prohibiting
such injunctions. Then, an accommodation between Section 4 and Section
301 was reached in Lincoln Mills, although the Court could have refused
to do so had it engaged in "literal" reading. 0
21 368 U.S. 502 (1962).
22 Id. at 508-09.
23 369 U.S. 95 (1962).
24 Id. at 102-03.
25 312 U.S. 219 (1941).
20 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1964).
27 312 U.S. 219, 231 (1941).
28 353 U.S. 30 (1957).
29 45 U.S.C. § 153 (1964).
30 353 U.S. 448, 458 (1957).
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Certainly it would not have taken a long jump to bridge the gap between
Hutcheson, Chicago River, and Lincoln Mills on the one hand and Sinclair
on the other, yet the Court specifically rejected such analogies. It dis-
tinguished Chicago River by noting that there it was Congress and not the
parties themselves who compelled binding arbitration. Nothing in the legis-
lative history of the Railway Labor Act indicated that Congress had de-
bated and rejected an express repeal of the Norris-La Guardia Act as it
had in enacting Section 301.31 Distinguishing Lincoln Mills, the Court ar-
gued that the kinds of conduct there enjoined were not of the type which
the Norris-La Guardia Act was specifically designed to prevent, whereas in
Sinclair an injunction against peaceful work stoppages would prohibit the
precise kinds of conduct which Congress had declared unenjoinable.
2
Clearly Sinclair would play havoc with the policy of arbitration, which the
Court had described as the "kingpin of federal labor policy." n33 If unions
could breach their no-strike promises without fear of injunction, then they
would retain a powerful economic weapon, the employer having surrendered
his by agreeing to binding arbitration of disputes. If that were the case,
then employers would most assuredly have to reconsider signing such
agreements, in which case the "kingpin" would soon be toppled. The ma-
jority solemnly took note of the argument that injunctions against such
strikes were necessary to make the arbitration process effective, stating
that Congress had itself rejected that view. Therefore it was for Congress
to reconsider the desirability of modifying their decision.3 4
The difference in view between the majority and minority opinions in
Sinclair can best be described as a distinction between what is and what
ought to be. Both recognized the advantages of having a labor union
perform its contractual obligations. However, either through inaction or in-
ability to deal with a problem that it obviously foresaw, Congress left the
problem unresolved, apparently hoping that the courts would resolve it and
draw the fire from those adversely affected. That did not ensue.
We are thus left with the result that the federal courts, having been given
jurisdiction of these controversies, are denied the most effective means to
deal with them. Company A will be denied an injunction in federal court.
II. COMPANY A SEEKS AN INJUNCTION AGAINST UNION B
IN STATE COURT
A. Pre-Sinclair
The leading case in this area is McCarroll v. Los Angeles County Dist.
Council of Carpenters,"5 decided by Justice Traynor. Perceptively antici-
31 370 U.S. 195, 211 (1962).
32 Id. at 212.
33 Id. at 213.
34 Id.
35 49 Cal. 2d 45, 315 P.2d 322 (1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 932 (1958).
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pating the Sinclair decision, he held that although federal courts would be
barred by Section 4 from enjoining a peaceful strike which violated a labor
contract, state courts could grant such relief. He stated that Section 301,
rather than preempting state court jurisdiction, conferred concurrent juris-
diction on state and federal courts.3 6 Relying on Lincoln Mills, he recog-
nized that "substantive" federal law must govern.37 Both of these proposi-
tions were later confirmed by the United States Supreme Court in Dowd
Box3 8 and Lucas Flour.39
Justice Traynor refused to include within the applicable federal law the
anti-injunction provisions of Section 4, concluding that state courts were not
subject to those restraints. Two arguments were used to buttress this posi-
tion. First, he utilized the language of the Norris-La Guardia Act4" to
demonstrate that Congress had intended to place those jurisdictional limita-
tions only on federal courts. Then he referred to the policy behind the en-
actment of Section 301, describing it as one of enhancing the suability of
unions as entities by opening the federal courts to employers irrespective
of diversity jurisdiction. Nothing contained in that policy, he noted, re-
quired a state court to withhold injunctive relief when enforcing Section 301
rights. In language which has proven all too prophetic, he said:
We would give altogether too ironic a twist to this purpose [facilitating the
enforcement of labor contracts against unions] if we held that the actual effect
of the legislation was to abolish in state courts equitable remedies that had been
available, and leave an employer in a worse position in respect to the effective
enforcement of his contract than he was before the enactment of Section 301.41
Justice Traynor was obliged to apply federal "substantive" law, but drew
the line when faced with the prospect of incorporating therein federal
"remedial" law. Federal law was to be applied in ascertaining whether a
"right" of action existed, but state law controlled in granting a "remedy."
In dissent, Justice Carter agreed that federal law must be applied. How-
ever, as part of that law he would have included the anti-injunction provi-
sions of Section 4. In his view the right not to be enjoined was "a part and
parcel of the [federal] rights which may be exercised with reference to bar-
gaining agreements."
42
30 Id. at 60, 315 P.2d at 330.
37 Id. at 59, 315 P.2d at 329.
38 368 U.S. 502 (1962).
39 369 U.S. 95 (1962).
40 "No court of the United States . . . shall have jurisdiction to issue any . .. in-
junction in a case involving or growing out of a labor dispute. . . ." (emphasis added).
Norris-La Guardia Act (Labor Disputes) § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 101 (1964). For the view
that "court of the United States" means courts created by Congress pursuant to Article
III of the Constitution see International Longshoremen's Union v. Wirtz, 170 P.2d 183
(9th Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 919 (1949).
41 49 Cal. 2d 45, 63-64, 315 P.2d 322, 332 (1957).
42 Id. at 73-74, 315 P.2d at 338.
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The problems engendered by any attempt to distinguish "substantive"
law from "procedural" or "remedial" law are beyond the bounds of this
discussion. It might be noted, however, that the "outcome" of McCarroll
was determined by the remedy granted. The remedial law to be applied
could be thought of as substantive in nature,43 and to that extent no injunc-
tion should have been granted once Justice Traynor determined that federal
substantive law controlled.
B. Post Sinclair
In Shaw Electric Co. v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers Local 9844
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in accord with the McCarroll decision,
held that it had jurisdiction to enjoin a union from striking in violation of a
no-strike clause.
The Court's reasoning proceeded along very structured lines. The enact-
ment of Section 301 did not confine jurisdiction to federal courts. Although
Lucas Flour required the use of substantive principles of federal law, its
emphasis on uniformity of application related only to the interpretation of
the contractual provisions in the agreement. Section 301 does not carry
with it Section 4 as part of the body of federal substantive law which state
courts must apply when they seek to enforce Section 301 rights. Even if
Section 4 were "woven into the fabric of Section 301," it would not deny to
the states their inherent injunctive power, for Congress intended Section 4 to
be applicable to federal courts only.45 The fact that state courts might be-
come the preferred forum for such actions did not deter the Court. It
reasoned that no erosion of Section 301 rights would occur because it readily
acknowledged that federal law, "where applicable," governed such suits even
though the action was brought in a state court.
46
But that is exactly the point at issue. If federal law "governs" in suits
brought to enforce Section 301 rights and Section 4, as a result of Sinclair, is
a part of that federal law, then are not state as well as federal courts pre-
cluded from granting injunctions in these cases? It is apparent that
Congress did not intend Section 4 to apply to state courts47 and did not
intend Section 301 to limit previously available state remedies. Nonethe-
less, once Dowd Box, Lucas Flour, and Sinclair are digested, the impelling
conclusion is that the substantive federal law which must be applied by the
states includes Section 448 Therefore, it appears that state courts are barred
43 Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945). For a view supporting this
position see Crestwood Dairy, Inc. v. Kelley, 222 F. Supp. 614, 617 (E.D. N.Y. 1963).
44 418 Pa. 1, 208 A.2d 769 (1965).
45 Id. at 11-12, 208 A.2d at 775.
46 Id. at 13-14, 208 A.2d at 776.
47 See McCarroll v. Los Angeles County Dist. Council of Carpenters, 49 Cal. 2d 45,
315 P.2d 322 (1957).
48 But see Janofsky & Vaughn, The Affirmative Role of State Courts to Enjoin
[Vol. 2
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from enjoining no-strike clause violations.
To return to our hypothetical situation, Company A must conclude that
to proceed in federal court is folly, whereas the pursuit of the injunction in
the courts of states such as Pennsylvania and California will be rewarded
despite the above analysis. Therefore, if Company A still desires an injunc-
tion, it must file suit in a state court. Union B, however, may seek re-
moval to federal court by relying on section 1441, the federal removal stat-
ute.49 Company A must then move to remand the action to state court or
run the risk of being denied injunctive relief.
III. THE IMPACT OF THE FEDERAL REMOVAL STATUTE
ON McCarroll AND ITS PROGENY
In seeking remand, Company A will argue that the federal district court
is without jurisdiction to grant the relief prayed for, an injunction, because
Section 4 denies such jurisdiction to the federal court. Thus, it does not
have "original jurisdiction" to entertain the case. Although the claim could
have been framed in Section 301 language, it was predicated on a "state
created right" which antedated the passage of Section 301. The claim is
not one "arising under" the "laws of the United States"50 as it would be
had it been predicated on Section 301. Jurisdiction must be denied by the
federal court and the case remanded to the appropriate state court.
Just such an argument was accepted by the Third Circuit Court of Ap-
peals in American Dredging Co. v. Local 25, Marine Div., Int. U.O.P.
Eng.51 In a two-to-one decision, the court of appeals remanded the case
to the Pennsylvania state court. The majority disposed of the contention
that the federal district court could assume jurisdiction based on its power to
grant such relief as it deemed appropriate. The district court had held that
under Rule 54(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 52 it could have
Strikes in Breach of Collective Bargaining Agreements, 7 B.C. IND. & COM. L. Rnv. 869
(1966).
49 Removal of Causes Act § 1441, 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1964) provides in relevant
part:
(a) Except as otherwise expressly provided by Act of Congress, any civil action
brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United States
have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or the defend-
ants, to the district court of the United States for the district and division
embracing the place where such action is pending.
(b) Any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction
founded on a claim or right arising under the Constitution, treaties or laws
of the United States shall be removable without regard to the citizenship
or residence of the parties. (emphasis added).
50 See Removal of Causes Act § 1441(b), 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (1964).
51 338 F.2d 837 (3rd Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 935 (1965).
52 FED. R. Civ. P. 54(c) provides in part:
Except as to a party against whom a judgment is entered by default, every final
judgment shall grant the relief to which the party in whose favor it is rendered is
entitled, even if the party has not demanded such relief in his pleadings. (emphasis
added).
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granted money damages as an appropriate measure of relief.53  Then, re-
ferring to section 1441 (c),54 regarding joinder of causes of action, the dis-
trict court held that it had jurisdiction of the entire matter.55 The court of
appeals treated this as a bootstrap argument, stating that Rule 54(c) in
and of itself does not confer jurisdiction on the federal courts. Moreover,
Rule 82 of the Federal Rules55 specifically provides that the Rules shall not
be used to extend federal jurisdiction.
In an exaltation of form over substance, the court decided the case based
on the way the plaintiff had framed his complaint in the state court action.
To hold that Section 1441 may be recruited to defeat the Congressional pur-
pose in enacting Section 301(a) would be to mock reason and to deny justice,
where as here, the complaint was based solely on state-created rights and did not,
within its four corners, raise or present any controversy with respect to the
validity, construction or effect of Section 301(a) upon the determination of which
the result of the action depended. 57
Great reliance was placed by the majority on the statement made in Sinclair
that the count which sought an injunction was correctly dismissed "for lack
of jurisdiction under the Norris-La Guardia Act."58
The dissenting judge indicated that Sinclair was binding upon state
courts as part of the federal substantive law which they must apply when
enforcing Section 301 rights.59 Alternatively, he argued that the district
court had original jurisdiction because the Norris-La Guardia Act removed
only equity jurisdiction to grant injunctive relief, but did not remove subject
matter jurisdiction.6" Short shrift was made of the "state created right"
theory because Lucas Flour made federal law the "exclusive determinant"
in such cases, thereby sanctioning the use of a state forum but only to apply
federal labor law.61
Until 1967, the American Dredging case stood as the authoritative law on
the subject with only a lower federal court decision in the second circuit
to the contrary.62 In that year the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, in Avco
53 224 F. Supp. 985 (E.D. Pa. 1963).
54 Removal of Causes Act § 1441(c), 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c) (1964) provides:
Whenever a separate and independent claim or cause of action, which would be
removable if sued upon alone, is joined with one or more otherwise nonremovable
claims or causes of action, the entire case may be removed and the district court
may determine all issues therein, or, in its discretion, may remand all matters not
otherwise within its original jurisdiction.
55 224 F. Supp. 985, 989 (E.D. Pa. 1963).
56 FED. R. Civ. P. 82 provides in part:
These Rules shall not be construed to extend or limit the jurisdiction of the United
States district courts or the venue of actions therein.
57 338 F.2d 837, 848 (3rd Cir. 1964).
58 Id. at 840.
59 Id. at 858.
60 Id. In support of this view see Z. CHAFEE, SOME PROBLEMS OF EQUrry 368 (1950).
61 338 F.2d 837, 857 (3rd Cir. 1964).




Corp. v. Aero Lodge No. 735,63 unanimously rejected the reasoning of the
third circuit by holding that a plaintiff could not avoid the effect of section
1441 by framing his complaint in terms of "state created rights." It held
that despite its language, the complaint was predicated on a Section 301
right, so that the matter was removable as an action founded on a right "aris-
ing under the laws of the United States." 64 By way of dictum, the court ex-
pressed the view that state courts were prohibited by Sinclair from granting
injunctive relief. 65 It concluded that the plaintiff had suffered no injustice
as a result of having had the state court injunction dissolved.
To resolve the conflict between the two circuits, the United States Su-
preme Court granted certiorari. In view of Section 301, which authorized
the bringing of such suits in federal court, it was unanimously held that
under section 1441(b) the plaintiff's claim was one arising under the "laws
of the United States" within the original jurisdiction of the district court.66
Therefore, the defendant had the right to remove notwithstanding the fact
that the federal court was barred by Section 4 from granting the requested
relief. The Court clarified its remark in Sinclair concerning lack of juris-
diction under the Norris-La Guardia Act by stating that this referred solely
to the "equity jurisdiction" of the federal courts which was divested by the
Norris-La Guardia Act.67
It is now quite clear that when section 1441 and the Sinclair rule are
applied, Company A will be unable to secure an injunction in state as well
as federal courts. One possibility still remains for Company A. If the state
court had issued a temporary restraining order, as happened in Avco, the
defendant Union may nonetheless seek removal to federal court. Once hav-
ing assumed jurisdiction of the case under section 1441, the federal district
court may refuse to dissolve the state court injunction for such reasons as it
deems appropriate. The question will then arise whether the state court
injunction may be dissolved by the federal district court under general equity
theories or must be dissolved because the state court was itself without juris-
diction to grant the injunction had it properly applied the Sinclair rule. This
is merely a reformulation of the McCarroll question: whether state courts
must give effect to the Sinclair rule as part of that body of federal substan-
tive law which they must apply in fashioning Section 301 remedies.
The court of appeals in Avco would have denied to the states their
injunctive power in Section 301 cases and apparently would have reversed a
lower federal court had it refused to dissolve the state court injunction.
The Supreme Court expressly reserved judgment on this question68 although
63 376 F.2d 337 (6th Cir. 1967).
64 Id. at 340.
05 Id. at 342.
06 Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge No. 735, 390 U.S. 557 (1968).
67 Id. at 561.
68 Id. at 560 n.2, 561 n.4.
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it did quote with approval language from Lincoln Mills: "Federal interpre-
tation of the federal law will govern, not state law."0' 9 (emphasis added).
IV. POSSIBLE REMEDIES
Should the question come before it, the Supreme Court will make Sinclair
applicable to the states, thereby totally denying injunctive relief in such
cases. Such a decision is inevitable despite the fact that Section 301 had as
its central purpose the supplementation of state remedies, especially in states
where unions were not suable as legal entities. Once it is accepted that
Sinclair is part of our federal labor policy, there is no alternative but to
make Section 4 applicable to the states as part of that body of federal
substantive law which Lucas Flour requires the states to apply. This is not
changed by noting that Congress intended no such result. The problem re-
sults from the Sinclair decision itself, and the question really is: Did Con-
gress intend the result in the Sinclair case? Having several options open to
it when it enacted Section 301, Congress left the question unresolved. In
Sinclair the Supreme Court did not remedy Congress's indecision, and the
results followed logically once that decision was made.
The Court, even more than Congress, has encouraged labor and manage-
ment to voluntarily settle their disputes by means of binding arbitration. It
is a procedure whereby lab6r problems can be resolved without resort to the
work disruptions which have had such a debilitating effect on the economy.
There is no sound rationale for allowing a strike to continue when the
parties have agreed to binding arbitration, since the ultimate effect of the
strike is to undermine the arbitral process. If one accepts the view that
the national labor policy espoused in Lincoln Mills would be better served if
strikes in breach of contract could be enjoined, there are several possible
remedies for this unfortunate situation.
(1) The Supreme Court could reverse the position it took in Sinclair,
which was decided by a five-to-three margin. A concurring opinion in
Avco may shed some light on this point. Justice Stewart, joined by Justices
Brennan and Harlan, observed that the Court will "have an opportunity to
reconsider the scope and continuing validity of Sinclair."70 (emphasis added).
The dissenters in Sinclair were Justices Brennan, Harlan, and Douglas.
If Justice Stewart wishes to question the "continuing validity" of Sinclair,
then a nucleus of four members of the Court may be willing to overrule
Sinclair. The two newest members of the Court7l may provide the fifth vote
for reversal.
In any attempt to overrule Sinclair, the court- must resolve two issueg:
(i) whether Sinclair was correctly decided and (ii) the propriety of over-
09 Id. at 559.
70 Id. at 562.
71 Justices Fortas and Marshall.
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ruling it at this time. The Sinclair Court was faced with these key facts:
(i) the congressional purpose in enacting Section 301 was to provide a fed-
eral forum for enforcing collective agreements; (ii) the Norris-La Guardia
Act was one of the most significant and hard fought pieces of legislation ever
enacted to protect organized labor; (iii) Congress considered and rejected
a proposal which would have had the effect of repealing Section 4 insofar
as it applied to enforcement of Section 301 rights; (iv) in other sections of
the Taft-Hartley Act, Congress expressly repealed the Norris-La Guardia
Act where it impeded the congressional design. 72
Against such a background one could hardly say that Congress intended
to repeal Section 4 by the passage of Section 301. Neither the plain mean-
ing of the language of Section 301 nor its legislative history lend themselves
to such a construction. What then remains? At most we have the pos-
sibility that Congress desired to leave the task of resolving the issue to the
courts. That position was articulated in the Sinclair dissent by Justice
Brennan when he stated that it was reasonable to construe the conference
committee's elimination of the House repeal as leaving open the possibil-
ity of judicial accommodation. 73 One searches in vain for some indication
by Congress that such was its intent. The only clear statement of con-
gressional intent is that suits for breach of such agreements 'should remain
wholly private and should b6 left to the usual processes of the law.74 This
is hardly a resounding call for judicial accommodation.
What we apparently have is 'a desire by some members of the Court to
resolve the conflict 75 between the two statutes in a manner which comports
with their view of what Congress should have done. In fact, Congress did
reject such a proposal although for unarticulated reasons. In the fu-
ture, when Congress rejects a particular provision of a bill, need it include a
note to the Court indicating that their rejection is not to be taken as an invi-
tation to judicially construe such a provision back into the statute?
Congress was unwise in rejecting the House provision, but as Justice
Black stated, "[I]t is not this Court's business to review the wisdom of that
decision."7 6
If Sinclair has so frustrated the congressional purpose, why then has
Congress not remedied the situation? As was the case in enacting Section
72 370 U.S. 195, 204-05 (1962).
73 Id. at 224.
74 Id. at 207.
75 Labor Management Relations Act -(Taft-Hartley Act) § 301, 29 U.S.C. § 185
(1964) grants the federal courts jurisdiction of labor-management contract violations
without specifying the nature of the remedial relief available.. Norris-La Guardia
Act (Labor Disputes) § 4, 29 U.S.C. § 104 (1964) removes federal court jurisdiction
to grant injunctions against peaceful strikes growing out of labor disputes. There is no
actual conflict between these two statutes.
76 370 U.S. 195, 213 (1962).
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301, congressional silence should not be taken as an indication to the Court
to act in one manner or another. Rather, it may indicate Congress's inabil-
ity to effectively legislate in certain areas of national concern where a power
bloc's vital interests are at stake. At least in this case, it is not for the Court
to attempt to assume Congress's role.
The limitation on the federal courts' power to enjoin strikes was won by
organized labor at great cost.77  If that limitation is to be revoked, even in
part, the better arena for such a skirmish is in Congress, where the compet-
ing interests can marshal all their forces and arguments and the public also
can have its say.
(2) The parties could include in their collective bargaining agreement
an express provision granting the arbiter power to enjoin a strike which
breaches a no-strike clause. An example of such a suggested provision is
set out below. We shall assume that a typical collective bargaining contract
calling for binding arbitration of disputes is in force. The pertinent provi-
sions to be added follow:
1) There shall be no strikes, work stoppages, or lockouts.
2) Any dispute concerning the interpretation or application of the terms of the
agreement shall be resolved by resort to the described arbitration procedure.
Failure of either party to this agreement to follow the dispute procedure
outlined in step 3 shall be deemed a violation of this agreement.
3) Dispute Procedure
a) When a dispute arises it shall be discussed as soon as possible between
designated representatives of the parties to this agreement. If no agree-
ment is reached, either party may request immediate implementation
of step (b).
b) (This will contain a typical binding arbitration procedure).
c) In the event of a violation of Sections 1 or 2 above, either party can by-
pass steps (a) and (b) and resort to immediate arbitration. Upon
telegraphic notice to the offending party and the arbiters, the panel shall
hold a hearing within forty-eight hours and shall render an award
within twelve hours after the hearing. The panel shall make findings of
fact concerning the alleged violation and shall grant appropriate relief,
including a binding order to cease and desist from the illegal conduct.
In Ruppert v. Egelhofer78 the New York Court of Appeals enforced an
arbitration order enjoining a slowdown despite that state's own anti-injunc-
tion statute.79 That decision proceeded on the theory that the court was not
issuing its own injunction over the objection of the Union, the situation for
which the Norris-La Guardia Act was designed, but was enforcing the award
of the arbiters by whose decision both parties had agreed to be bound.
It has been common practice for federal courts to enforce arbitration
77 C. GREGORY, LABOR AND THE LAW, ch. I-VII (2d rev. ed. 1958).
78 3 N.Y.2d 576, 148 N.E.2d 129, 170 N.Y.S.2d 785 (1958). In Drake Bakeries,
Inc. v. American Bakery Workers Local 50, 370 U.S. 254 (1962), the Court noted the
Ruppert case in footnote 5 without comment.
79 N.Y. LABOR LAw § 807 (McKinney 1965).
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awards by injunction where other than strikes or picketing occurred.80 A re-
cent case has taken the Ruppert concept and given it vitality in the federal
courts. In New Orleans Steamship Ass'n v. General Longshore Workers
Local 141881 the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the Norris-La
Guardia Act did not deprive federal courts of jurisdiction to enforce an ar-
bitration award which had ordered a Union to cease and desist from work
stoppages. Sinclair was distinguished by limiting its application to the situa-
tion where an injunction was sought outside the arbitral process. The court
stated that:
[Mlore than semantical ground ... there is a real difference between an ordi-
nary injunction and an order enforcing the award of an arbitrator although the
end result is the same.82 (emphasis added).
The Norris-La Guardia Act was held inapplicable. The court reasoned
that once arbitration was completed there was no longer a labor dispute
which could be the subject of those provisions. It stated that Section 301
and Section 4 were to be construed "in pari materia" so as to effect an ac-
commodation.8
s
Once the "semantical" nuances are stripped, this appears to be an attempt,
albeit a successful one, to scale the mountain from the other side. The
United States Supreme Court has recently denied review of this case, 4 per-
haps indicating that Sinclair may lose vitality if such provisions become
commonplace.
(3) The best remedy would be for Congress to grasp the bit in its teeth
and do what it should have done initially. Professor Aaron, one of the
foremost authorities on labor law, has deemed it unlikely that Congress
will act, stating that "the triumph of legislative common sense is not yet
at hand."85 The pressing labor problems of farm workers and public
employees, however, may force Congress to undertake some new labor
legislation. As part of a legislative scheme dealing with these problems,
Congress may deem it advisable to amend Section 301. Such a provision
should repeal Section 4 insofar as it prohibits the equity jurisdiction of
federal courts to grant injunctions against peaceful strikes which breach
collective bargaining agreements. Only then will an agreement calling for
binding arbitration truly be a quid pro quo for an agreement not to strike.
Arthur Fields
80 Fountainbleau Hotel Corp. v. Hotel Employees Local 255, 328 F.2d 310 (5th
Cir. 1964).
81 389 F.2d 369 (5th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 89 S. Ct. 92 (1968).
82 Id. at 372.
83 Id.
84 General Longshore Workers Local 1418 v. New Orleans Steamship Ass'n, 389 F.2d
369 (5th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 89 S. Ct. 92 (1968).
85 Aaron, Strikes in Breach of Collective Agreements: Some Unanswered Questions,
63 COLuM. L. REv. 1027, 1030 (1963).
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